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ABSTRACT
Using data on the universe of students who graduated from U.S. medical schools between 1996
and 1998, we examine whether the abilities and specialty preferences of a medical school class affect a
student’s academic achievement in medical school and his choice of specialty. We mitigate the selection
problem by including school-specific fixed effects, and show that this method yields an upper bound on
peer effects for our data. We estimate positive peer effects that disappear when school-specific fixed
effects are added to control for the endogeneity of a peer group. We find no evidence that peer effects are
stronger for blacks, that peer groups are formed along racial lines, or that students with relatively low
ability benefit more from their peers than students with relatively high ability. However, we do find some
evidence that peer groups form along gender lines.
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The belief that peer groups in schools inﬂuence the behavior and outcomes of their members
has been important in shaping public policy. The Coleman report (Coleman et al., 1966)
concluded that peer eﬀects in public schools contributed to diﬀerences in the achievement
of black and white students. Busing was implemented in many school districts due in part
to this ﬁnding. Moreover, one of the principal arguments against school vouchers is that
the best students will leave the public school system, and thereby impair the performance of
the students who remain behind. Several recent theoretical papers on the impact of school
vouchers assume that student achievement is inﬂuenced by the characteristics, achievement, or
behavior of a person’s classmates (Nechyba, 2000; Caucutt, 2000; Epple and Romano, 1998).
There is a substantial empirical literature examining how peer groups aﬀect teenagers’
criminal behavior (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996), the likelihood that teenagers
will become pregnant and complete high school (Evans, Oates, and Schwab, 1992), grade school
childrens’ achievement (Hoxby, 2000; Ding and Lehrer, 2001), college students’ grades, choice
of major, and fraternity choices (Sacerdote, 2001; Arcidiacono, 1999), and high school students’
drug and alcohol use, cigarette smoking, church attendance, and the likelihood of completing
high school (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001). However, many economists remain skeptical of
estimates of social interactions due, in part, to the diﬃculty of separately measuring the eﬀect
of a peer group, the eﬀect of unobserved characteristics shared by members of the peer group,
and the eﬀect of the environment (e.g., a school) in which the members of the peer group
operate (Manski, 2000).
Most existing studies of peer groups focus on adolescents and grade school children. The
inﬂuence of peer groups on medical students’ specialty choices may have important policy
implications because many policy makers believe the U.S. has a shortage of physicians in the
primary care specialties (pediatrics, family practice, and general internal medicine), which
contributes to high health care expenditures and inadequate access to medical care (Physician
Payment Review Commission, 1995). The federal government provides a higher subsidy to
teaching hospitals for training primary care rather than non-primary care residents, and a
majority of state governments passed bills in the 1990s to provide loans and scholarships to
medical students who enter primary care specialties (Nicholson, 2001).
Physicians in primary care specialties generally earn much less than physicians in non-
primary care specialties. In 1997, for example, the mean annual income exceeded $200,000
in 11 non-primary care specialties (e.g., orthopedic surgery, radiology, cardiology), while the
1mean income in the three primary care specialties were all under $150,000. Women and blacks
are much more likely than men and whites to choose the relatively low-paying primary care
specialties. Forty-two percent of female physicians were in a primary specialty in 2000 versus
29 percent of male physicians, and 46 percent of black physicians were in a primary care
specialty versus 33 percent of white physicians. Occupational segregation is more striking
in certain high-paying specialties. Women represented 25 percent of doctors in 2000 but
accounted for only 3.5 percent of orthopedic surgeons, the specialty with the highest mean
income. If peer groups inﬂuence students’ specialty choices, medical schools may be able to
encourage more students to enter primary care and promote greater gender and racial balance
across specialties by altering their admission policies to change the characteristics of their
matriculating students.
In order to examine the inﬂuence of medical school peer groups, we have obtained access
to a data set on the universe of students who graduated from a U.S. medical school between
1996 and 1998. Medical students take a standardized exam, the Medical College Admissions
Test (MCAT), before entering medical school. The MCAT score provides us with a uniform
measure of each student’s ability before they join their peer group – their medical school
class. Medical students spend their ﬁrst and second year together in the same classes, so
a medical school class (e.g., students matriculating at Harvard Medical School in 1993) is
arguably the relevant peer group – the unit in which students interact. Performing well in
medical school is important because residency positions in high-income specialties such as
orthopedic surgery and dermatology are rationed (Nicholson, 2001). As a result, students
who receive high scores on the National Board of Medical Examiners test (commonly referred
to as the board exam), which is taken between the second and third years of medical school,
will have a relatively high probability of entering a high-income specialty when they complete
medical school. We also observe each student’s preferred specialty at the beginning and end
of medical school, so we can identify people who switch specialties after their peer group has
been formed. In the market that we study, therefore, members of a peer group can aﬀect a
medical student’s future earnings by improving a student’s accumulation of human capital,
and thereby increasing the student’s likelihood of being admitted into a high-income specialty,
and by inﬂuencing a student’s specialty preference directly.
Manski (1993) highlights three empirical challenges when measuring peer eﬀects. First,
peer groups are endogenous. Students who choose to attend the same school probably share
similar observed as well as unobserved characteristics. Therefore, an association between the
2observed characteristics of a peer group and the outcomes of individual members of the group
may not imply a causal relationship if outcomes are aﬀected by an unobserved characteristic
(e.g., motivation). Second, by deﬁnition members of a peer group operate in the same environ-
ment and are exposed to the same set of policies. In our context, students at a medical school
take the same courses from the same faculty, which makes it diﬃcult to isolate the impact of
a peer group from the impact of the school itself. Third, if behavior by two members of a peer
group aﬀect each other simultaneously, it is diﬃcult to measure the causal eﬀect of any single
member on another member’s behavior. This reﬂection problem is less relevant in our study
because we focus on whether the characteristics of peer group members before the observation
period (medical school) aﬀect the behavior of other members during the observation period.
Unlike Hoxby (2000) and Sacerdote (2001), 1 our peer groups are not random; prospective
medical students choose where to apply. The richness of our data, however, does allow us
to address the endogenous nature of a peer group. We include school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to
control for unobserved characteristics that are shared by students who attend the same medical
school, and to control for the inﬂuence of the school itself on the outcomes and behavior of
its students. The peer eﬀect variables are identiﬁed by variation within a school over time in
the entering students’ abilities and specialty preferences. In Manski’s (1993) framework, the
school ﬁxed eﬀects allow us to separately identify the correlated eﬀects (common unobserved
characteristics of the constituents of the peer group and the common environment in which
the group members operate) from the exogenous eﬀects (characteristics and background of
the students in the peer group).
Our approach yields an upper bound on peer eﬀects if cohorts with high observed ability
are also cohorts with high unobserved ability. We present evidence that the observed and
unobserved abilities of medical school classes are positively correlated by examining how the
average observed ability of an entering medical school class varies within a school over time
as the size of the applicant pool varies, and as the percentage of entrants who are in-state
residents varies. High observed ability is correlated with high applicant to entrant ratios and
low percentages of in-state entrants, suggesting that cohorts with high observed ability also
1Sacerdote (2001) examines peer eﬀects at the room and dormitory level at Dartmouth College, where
freshmen are randomly assigned to rooms and dorms. He ﬁnds that peer groups deﬁned at the dormitory level
have no eﬀect on an individual’s grade point average and choice of major, but the grade point average of a
person’s roommate does have a positive eﬀect on the person’s own grade point average. Hoxby (2000) examines
grade school children in Texas and assumes that gender, race, and ability variation across schools over time is
random. She ﬁnds that students receive higher reading scores when their classmates have high reading scores
relative to the particular school and grade.
3have high unobserved ability.
One of the additional advantages of having data on the universe of medical students is that
we can experiment with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of a peer group. If students form peer groups
based upon their race or gender, an analyst who only observes the characteristics of the entire
student population may falsely conclude that there are no spillovers from a peer group to its
members. We are also able to test whether a peer group exerts a stronger inﬂuence on men
versus women, blacks versus non-blacks, and high versus (relatively) low ability students. By
contrast, most existing studies of peer eﬀects either have aggregated data on the characteristics
of a peer group (e.g., proportion of each school’s students with household income below the
poverty line), or individual-speciﬁc data for a single school (e.g., grade point average for each
student at a single college).
We ﬁnd that the abilities and specialty preferences of a peer group have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on medical students’ performance on the board exam and on students’ specialty choices when
we assume the characteristics of a person’s peer group are exogenous. After controlling for the
endeogeneity of peer groups using school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, however, most of the peer eﬀects
disappear. Although a student’s board score and ultimate specialty choice are inﬂuenced by
the school they attend, the transmission mechanism does not appear to be the abilities and
specialty preferences of the student’s classmates. Using a variety of deﬁnitions of a peer
group in the school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects model, we ﬁnd no evidence that peer groups aﬀect
specialty choices or performance on the board exam for males or blacks. The only evidence
of a peer eﬀect is for female students. Females who attend schools where the other female
students received relatively high scores on the verbal portion of the MCAT exam subsequently
receive higher board scores themselves, although the magnitude of this eﬀect is small. In all
speciﬁcations, the eﬀect of the specialty preferences of a student’s peer group on his own
specialty choice disappears after controlling for school ﬁxed eﬀects.
We also examine whether a peer group exerts a diﬀerent inﬂuence on low- versus high-
ability students. Redistributing students to diﬀerent schools according to their ability will
not improve overall student performance if peer eﬀects are symmetric – if low-ability students
beneﬁt from high-ability students, and high-ability students are harmed in a equal manner by
low-ability students. People opposed to tracking students according to ability, on the other
hand, argue that low-ability students beneﬁt from the presence of high-ability students, but
the presence of low-ability students has few negative consequences for the high-ability students.
We ﬁnd no evidence of asymmetric peer group eﬀects according to students’ abilities, whether
4or not we include school ﬁxed eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the process by which medical
students choose specialties. The data are described in Section 3. We present the model and
the empirical approach in Section 4, discuss the results in Section 5, and conclude in Section
6.
2 How Medical Students Choose a Specialty
Physicians in the United States practice in more than 40 diﬀerent specialties. There are sub-
stantial income diﬀerences between the specialties and substantial diﬀerences in non-monetary
attributes such as the type of patients treated (e.g., children versus adult; chronically ill versus
relatively healthy), the amount of face-to-face contact with patients, the length of residency
training, and the probability of being sued for malpractice.
Medical students do not formally choose a specialty until the fourth year of medical school
when students apply for a residency position in a particular specialty. In the ﬁrst two years
of school students take required courses such as anatomy and pharmacology that are general
rather than speciﬁc to a specialty. Medical students begin their clinical training with a series
of required clerkships or rotations in the third year, including internal medicine, surgery,
pediatrics, psychiatry, obstetrics/gynecology, and family practice. In these rotations students
treat patients under the supervision of residents and faculty. Fourth-year students take elective
rotations in specialties such as plastic surgery, dermatology, and infectious diseases. Students
are likely, therefore, to learn about the characteristics of specialties after taking the board
exam.
Over 92 percent of U.S. medical students enter the National Resident Matching Program
in the Spring of their fourth year. In the Match, as it is commonly referred to, students rank
residency programs in descending order of preference and residency programs rank students in
descending order of preference. A computer algorithm then assigns students to residency pro-
grams taking into consideration the preferences of both parties (Roth, 1984). All fourth-year
medical students who are in good academic standing are technically qualiﬁed to apply to a
residency program in any specialty. In many-high income specialties, however, there are more
applicants than available positions (Nicholson, 2001). As a result, positions are rationed; stu-
dents who perform well in medical school will be ranked relatively high by residency program
directors and will therefore have a better chance of receiving a position in the Match.
Orthopedic surgery provides a good illustration of the rationing process. Practicing or-
5thopedic surgeons had the highest mean income of any specialty ($313,000) in 1998. Between
1996 and 1998, the number of medical students who listed an orthopedic surgery residency
program ﬁrst in the Match exceeded the number of available positions by an average of 53
percent per year.
In Table I we report coeﬃcient estimates from a probit regression for students whose
preferred specialty in the fourth year of medical school was orthopedic surgery. The dependent
variable takes on the value of one if a student was actually training in an orthopedic surgery
residency program after graduating from medical school, and a zero otherwise. We use the
score on the board exam, a uniform national exam that covers material from the ﬁrst two
years of medical school and is taken between the second and third years of school, to measure
student performance in medical school. The board exam is important because it is one of
three tests an individual must pass in order to be licensed to practice medicine in the United
States and residency program directors often consider the score when evaluating applicants
(Crane and Ferraro, 2000).
The coeﬃcient on the board score in Table I is positive as expected. In the bottom
panel of Table I we report the predicted probability that three diﬀerent students would be
able to receive a residency position in orthopedic surgery. A white male student who has the
median board score among fourth-year students who prefer orthopedic surgery has a predicted
probability of 0.89 of receiving a residency position in the specialty. Otherwise similar students
with board scores at the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile have predicted probabilities
of 0.70 and 0.96, respectively. In general, the probability of entering a specialty is inversely
related to the average income of the specialty, and the board score has a stronger eﬀect on
entry probabilities in high-income than low-income specialties (Nicholson, 2001).
The entry probabilities in Table I most likely understate the importance of medical school
performance on specialty choice for two reasons. First, a high board score probably helps
the student match to a more prestigious residency program within a particular specialty and
to a residency program in a relatively desirable location. Second, students are aware of the
rationing process and probably self-select into specialties where they have a good chance of
matching. Hence, a person with low unobserved ability will only enter the match in ortho-
pedic surgery if he has a high unobservable preference for orthopedic surgery or high hidden
information that he would be able to ﬁnd a match. If the hidden information on matching
is uncorrelated with board scores and unobservable preferences, the selection on the hidden
information will bias the estimated eﬀect of board scores downward. That is, those who have
6low board scores and still choose orthopedic surgery on average have higher values of the
hidden information.
Although medical students might not be aware of the diﬃculty of entering high-income
specialties when they ﬁrst enter medical school, they are clearly aware of how competitive
certain specialties are by the time they take the board exam. A book that many second-year
medical students use to help prepare for the board exam advises students regarding how well
they need to do on the board exam in order to have a good chance of entering each specialty.
Students who would like to match in dermatology, ENT, orthopedic surgery, or opthalmology
are advised in a recent edition to “ace the exam”; students interested in emergency medicine,
ob/gyn, radiology and general surgery are advised to “beat the mean”; and students who plan
to enter pediatrics, family practice, internal medicine, anesthesiology, and psychiatry need
only “comfortably pass” the exam (Bhushan, Chu, and Hansen, 1998).
Manski (2000) outlines three ways that an action by one agent may aﬀect the actions
of other agents in the same peer group: expectations, constraints, and preferences. Each of
these three channels appears to be important for medical students. First, as medical students
acquire information on the monetary and non-monetary attributes of each specialty, the re-
vealed expectations (e.g., starting salary) of one’s fellow students may inﬂuence a person’s
own expectations. Second, if medical schools impose explicit or implicit quotas on the number
of students they will support for residency training in each specialty, or if medical students
perceive that schools behave in this manner, then when one student expresses a preference
for a specialty it could reduce the probability that her peers will also choose that specialty.
Alternatively, consider a student who matriculates at a medical school where the majority of
ﬁrst-year students plan to enter a high-income specialty. Since residency positions are rationed
according to performance in medical school, the specialty preferences of the peer group might
create a highly-competitive environment that makes it less costly for other students to study
hard. Third, the revealed specialty preferences of a person’s classmates might directly aﬀect
a person’s own ordering of specialty alternatives.
3 Data
The sample for this paper is the universe of medical students (n=47,755) who graduated from
a U.S. medical school in 1996, 1997, or 1998. Students were surveyed in the Fall of their ﬁrst
year and the Spring of their fourth year by the Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC). On these surveys students were asked to indicate their preferred specialty or to
7indicate if they were undecided about a specialty. The AAMC survey response rates among
the ﬁrst-year and fourth-year students were 90.5 percent and 86.7 percent, respectively.
The Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) is our measure of students’ initial ability.
The MCAT has three sections that are separately graded: physical sciences, biological sciences,
and verbal reasoning. Each of the three components of the MCAT exam has a maximum of
15 points. We use the board exam to measure student performance in medical school.
After consolidating the AAMC surveys with test score data and eliminating observations
with missing values, we have complete data on MCAT scores, board scores, ﬁrst- and fourth-
year specialty preferences, and demographic information for 31,698 students across 124 U.S.
medical schools. The three most common reasons why students were dropped from the sample
were if they took the MCAT exam before 1991 when the format was slightly diﬀerent (4,792
students dropped for this reason), if they failed to complete the ﬁrst-year AAMC survey (3,703
students dropped for this reason), or if they failed to complete the fourth-year AAMC survey
(4,632 students dropped for this reason). We also deleted 392 students who attended one of
the three medical schools where a majority of the students are black because the racial mix,
and probably the peer group structure, are so diﬀerent at these three schools than at the other
124 schools. To analyze potential bias in our sample, we ran a probit regression where the
dependent variable is one for students who were dropped from the analytic data set. Students
with lower verbal reasoning and biology MCAT scores, blacks, males, ﬁrst-year students who
preferred a low-income specialty, and students who graduated in 1996 were more likely to be
deleted from the sample.
Sample means are reported in Table II. Forty-three percent of the students are female
and 5.4 percent are black. Two variables are created to capture the ability and specialty
preferences of each student’s peer group. For most of the analysis we deﬁne a person’s peer
group as all other students who graduate from his/her school in the same year (e.g., 1997
graduates of Jeﬀerson Medical College), other than the student in question. In some cases we
deﬁne the peer group more narrowly as all female or all black students who graduate from a
particular school in a particular year. The ability peer eﬀects are deﬁned as the mean MCAT
scores for each section by a student’s classmates; the specialty peer eﬀect is deﬁned as the
proportion of a student’s classmates who indicated a preference for a high-income specialty in
their ﬁrst year of school.
The mean combined MCAT score for the 124 medical schools over all three years ranges
from a low of 16.8 (out of a possible 45) at the lowest-scoring school to 34.0 at the highest-
8scoring school, with a mean of 28.2. The proportion of ﬁrst-year students interested in a
high-income specialty ranges from 0.066 to 0.667 across schools, with a sample mean of 0.33.
For our analysis, we aggregate the specialties into high- and low-income categories. The
following specialties had a mean income of $220,000 or more during the 1991 to 1997 time
period and are classiﬁed as high-income specialties: surgery, medical sub-specialties, radiology,
anesthesiology, pathology, and obstetrics.2 Low-income specialties include internal medicine,
emergency medicine, pediatrics, family practice, and psychiatry. Students undecided about a
specialty constitute a third specialty category.
4 The Model and Empirical Approach
We examine the students’ performances on the board exam as well as their speciality choices
in the ﬁnal year of medical school. First we present a base model, ignoring for the moment
the endogeneity of a student’s peer group. Next we describe how we control for the potential
biases that may result because students choose their peer group, and we demonstrate why our
method yields an upper bound on the eﬀect of the peer group.
Finding the right deﬁnition of a peer group is one of the goals of this paper. In particular,
the proper characterization of a student’s peer group may be the medical class as a whole, or
it may consist only of students of the same race or sex as the reference person. A second goal
is to examine whether peer groups have stronger eﬀects for particular groups of people. For
example, Neal (1997) ﬁnds that blacks from low income families experience the largest test
score improvements from attending Catholic schools. We experiment with many peer group
deﬁnitions and allow peer groups to have diﬀerent eﬀects across racial and gender groups, and
across ability levels.
4.1 The Base Model
The board score for individual i, Bi, is assumed to be a function of both the individual’s and
the peer group’s abilities and preferences. An individual’s scores on the three components of
the MCAT exam represents his observed ability, Aoi. People may exert more or less eﬀort in
preparation for the board exam depending on the specialty they intend to pursue. We therefore
control for diﬀerential eﬀort by including an indicator variable for an individual’s specialty
preferences, d1i. This indicator variable takes on a value of one if the individual expresses a
2Income data on practicing physicians are from the American Medical Association’s annual Socioeconomic
Monitoring Study, a stratiﬁed random sample of practicing physicians.
9preference for a high-income specialty when they ﬁrst matriculate in medical school.3
We allow both the abilities and the specialty preferences of a peer group to aﬀect the board
score of the peer group’s constituents. The observed ability of the peer group is represented by
the average score on each of the three sections of the MCAT exam, Aoi. Students interested
in a high-income specialty may work harder in medical school to improve their chances of
entering these competitive specialties. When members of a person’s peer group work hard, it
may become less costly for that person to exert eﬀort. The specialty preferences of the peer
group are represented by the proportion of the peer group who prefer a high-income specialty
at the beginning of medical school, d1i.
The estimating equation for a student’s board score is expressed as follows:
Bi = β0 + Aoiβ1 + d1iβ2 + Aoiβ3 + d1iβ4 + Bi (1)
= ZBiβ + Bi (2)
where Bi is unobserved and is assumed to be distributed N(0,σ2
B).
The specialty a student chooses in the fourth year of school is a function of demographic
characteristics of the individual (Xi), the individual’s board score (Bi), his initial specialty
preference (d1i), and the specialty preferences of his peer group (d1i). Note that a student’s
observed ability and the observed ability of their peer group aﬀect specialty choice only through
the board score.
An individual’s latent utility of choosing a high-income or low-income specialty can be
expressed as follows:
UHi = αH0 + XiαH1 + BiαH2 + d1iαH3 + d1iαH4 + Hi (3)
ULi = αL0 + XiαL1 + BiαL2 + d1iαL3 + d1iαL4 + Li (4)
where Hi and Li represent the individual’s unobserved specialty preferences.4
Subtracting the latter equation from the former yields the diﬀerence in utility from choosing
a high- rather than a low-income specialty in the fourth year of medical school:
UHi − ULi = α0 + Xiα1 + Biα2 + d1iα3 + d1iα4 + Si (5)
= ZSiα + Si (6)
3Although we do control for initial specialty preferences in both the board score and specialty choice equa-
tions, the qualitative results do not change substantially if d1i is omitted. Further, there is virtually no sorting
on initial specialty choice by MCAT scores, suggesting that this variable represents individuals’ preferences.
4We use d1i = 1 as opposed to d1i = 0 in this latter equation so that the variables in the two equations are
consistent. Since either d1i = 1 or d1i = 0, only the constant term is aﬀected by this notation.
10We observe whether this utility diﬀerence is positive or negative, where:
d2i = 1 if UHi − ULi ≥ 0
= 0 if UHi − ULi < 0 (7)
Students who want to enter a high-income specialty need to receive a relatively high score
on the board exam. A ﬁrst- or second-year medical student who experiences a preference
shock that increases the utility of a high-income specialty will work harder when preparing for
the board exam. Therefore, we expect the unobserved component of the board score equation
to be correlated with the unobserved component of specialty utilities. If one does not control
for this correlation, the coeﬃcient estimate on the board exam, α2, will be biased, most likely
upward. An upward bias in α2 would cause us to overestimate the eﬀect of a peer group’s
ability on a person’s specialty choice, as transmitted through the person’s board score. We
assume instead that the unobservables in equation (7) and the unobservables in equation (1)








The joint density f(B,S) can be expressed as:
f(B,S) = f(S|B)f(B) (9)
With this factorization, Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) show that the log likelihood function
for individual i can be written as the sum of two parts:5
L1i = d2i lnΦ(Wi) + (1 − d2i)ln[1 − Φ(Wi)] (10)








ZSiα + (Bi − ZBiβ)ρBSσB
(1 − ρ2
BS).5 (12)
and Φ(W) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
If the correlation between S and B were zero, the ﬁrst part of the log likelihood function
would simplify to a probit speciﬁcation. The key assumption needed to identify ρ is that at
least one variable in ZB is not in ZS. We include initial ability measures (MCAT scores) in
5Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) use this method to control for the endogeneity of a student’s peer group.
We use this method to control for the eﬀect of specialty preferences on the eﬀort exerted by a student in
preparation for the board exam.
11ZB but not in ZS. That is, we assume that a student’s initial ability aﬀects their board score
(which in turn aﬀects specialty choice), but the MCAT score itself has no independent eﬀect
on their specialty choice. We believe this is an appropriate speciﬁcation as the MCAT score
had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of obtaining a residency position in the student’s
preferred specialty when the student’s board score was also included in the model.
4.2 Endogenous Peer Groups
A natural criticism of the proposed speciﬁcation is that students choose their medical school,
so there may exist an unobserved ability variable Au that is correlated with both the average
observed ability and the observed ﬁrst-year specialty choices of a school’s students. Students
who have high values of this unobserved ability measure may enroll at schools where the
level of unobserved ability of their peers is also high. Not being able to directly control for
unobserved ability may therefore bias upward the estimates of peer eﬀects (both in estimating
board scores and specialty choices) because the peer measure would capture some of the eﬀect
of an individual’s own unobserved ability.
Similar to Dale and Krueger (2000), suppose that a medical school’s admission oﬃcers
actually observe a student’s unobserved ability. School j admits student i if
Aoi + Aui + ij > sj, (13)
where sj is some threshold combination of observed and unobserved ability and ij is noise that
is uncorrelated with either ability measure. Schools that have higher thresholds will accept
students with higher values of both Ao and Au.
It is here that we take advantage of the panel aspect of our data set. In particular, we
add school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the average ability of students, both observed
and unobserved, at each school. When school ﬁxed eﬀects are included, the coeﬃcients on the
peer eﬀect variables are identiﬁed by variations within schools over time in the average ability
and specialty preferences of the medical school class. The question we examine, therefore,
is whether a student’s performance in school and chosen specialty change if he matriculates
at a particular school with a high-ability cohort or a cohort that has a strong preference for
high-income specialties.
Including school indicator variables allows us to separately identify the correlated eﬀects
from the exogenous peer eﬀects in Manski’s (1993) framework. Correlated eﬀects exist if
the school itself or a student’s unobserved ability aﬀects board scores and specialty choices;
12exogenous peer eﬀects exist when the characteristics of a group aﬀect the decisions of its
members.
Our method will yield an upper bound on the estimates of the peer eﬀects if cohorts with
high observed ability also have high unobserved ability. This will be the case when a school’s
admission standards change over time, due to a particularly strong and/or large applicant
pool. Another possibility, however, is that the admission standards do not change over time,
but instead medical schools admit classes with the same overall ability but with a diﬀerent
composition of observed and unobserved ability. School ﬁxed eﬀects would then fully capture
the peer eﬀect.6 We examine the relationship between the size of the applicant pool and
the observed ability of each medical school class and ﬁnd evidence supporting the former
hypothesis above; cohorts at medical schools that have relatively high observed ability are
likely to also have relatively high unobserved ability.
To show this, we perform two tests using data from the Medical School Admission Require-
ments publication for 1992-1994, the years when the students in our sample enrolled in medical
school. At some medical schools the number of applicants varied substantially between 1992
and 1994, due presumably to changes in the prestige, reputation, and relative tuition of a
school, or to other idiosyncratic factors. For example, the number of applicants to George
Washington’s medical school increased from 8,496 for the 1992-93 school year to 12,074 for
the 1994-95 school year, while Georgetown experienced a much smaller increase (from 9,100
to 11,894). During this time period, the number of entrants at the two schools, and at med-
ical schools generally, was constant. Similarly, Columbia had fewer applicants (2,463) than
Harvard (2,949) for the 1992-93 school year; by the 1994-95 school year, however, Columbia
had more applicants (3,508 to Harvard’s 3,424). Again, these changes in applicants occurred
with virtually no change in the number of entering ﬁrst-year students.
In our ﬁrst test, we examine whether schools admit students with higher observed ability in
years when they have a high applicant to entrant ratio. We regress the mean MCAT score of a
school’s entering students on school indicator variables, a time trend, and the school’s applicant
to entrant ratio. We include a time trend because applications to medical schools increased
during this period. The mean MCAT score of an entering class was signiﬁcantly higher, at
the 90 percent level, in years when a school’s applicant to entrant ratio was relatively high.
Furthermore, this result is signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level when we restrict the sample to
6Note that this is only an issue for the ability peer eﬀects; no such argument could be made with the
specialty preference peer eﬀects.
13private schools.7 It seems reasonable to assume that if an increase in the number of applicants
is associated with an increase in the observed ability of an entering class, then the same
relationship would hold true for unobserved ability.
The second test examines the composition of the entering class. Public medical schools
may be encouraged by state legislatures to admit a quota of in-state students. If so, we would
expect out-of-state entrants to have higher observed and unobserved ability than in-state
entrants at public medical schools. We examine how MCAT scores vary with the proportion
of entrants who are residents of the same state where the medical school is located. We ﬁnd
that the mean MCAT score is signiﬁcantly higher, at the 95 percent level, in years when the
percentage of matriculating students who are state residents is lower than the mean percentage
for that school. Since out-of-state applicants most likely have high observed and unobserved
ability, this result suggests that high observed ability cohorts are also high unobserved ability
cohorts. Both of these tests support the hypothesis that cohorts with high observed ability
also have high unobserved ability cohorts, which implies that our method will yield an upper
bound on the true peer eﬀect.
One potential diﬃculty of using school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is that there may not be enough
variation in the mean abilities and specialty preferences of entering cohorts within a school
over time to identify the peer eﬀects. If this is the case, the standard errors will be so large that
the point estimates become meaningless. This does not occur in our analysis. Furthermore,
the two previous tests demonstrate that there are substantial diﬀerences in abilities between
cohorts.8
5 Results
5.1 Estimates of the Board Score Equation
Although the parameters of the board score equation and specialty choice equations are es-
timated jointly, we present the estimation results separately for ease of interpretation. We
discuss the ﬁt of the model when reviewing the results on specialty choice. Throughout, the
deﬁnition of the peer group is constant within a particular speciﬁcation. For example, if peer
7The coeﬃcient on the applicant to entrant ratio was insigniﬁcant when the sample was limited to state
schools, which may be due to constraints that state schools face to admit a quota of state residents. An increase
in the applicant to entrant ratio may produce higher ability in-state applicants, but these students might still
be below average relative to the out-of-state accepted applicants. We address this issue with the second test.
8Although we did not analyze it formally above, the descriptive data indicate that there is even greater
variation in specialty preferences than abilities between cohorts at a medical school.
14groups are deﬁned by gender in the board score equation, they are deﬁned identically in the
specialty choice equation.
In Table III we present the board score results when a peer group is deﬁned to be a
person’s medical school class as a whole, excluding the person himself. The two columns
report results of the same regression with and without school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Students
with high initial ability, as measured by their scores on the three components of the MCAT
exam, also perform well on the board exam. The score on the biological sciences component
of the MCAT exam has an eﬀect on the board score that is three times the magnitude of the
verbal score. Students who preferred a high-income specialty or were undecided about their
specialty in the ﬁrst year of school received slightly higher board scores relative to students
who initially preferred a low-income specialty. Although the magnitude of this eﬀect is small,
it does imply that students who plan to enter high-income specialties either have relatively
high unobserved ability or work relatively hard to prepare for the board exam.
In column one the ability peer eﬀect for the verbal MCAT score is positive and signiﬁcant;
students who attend schools where other ﬁrst-year students have relatively high verbal MCAT
scores also receive relatively high board scores themselves. The ability peer eﬀects for biological
and physical sciences are not signiﬁcant. The specialty preferences of a person’s peer group
are also correlated with outcomes on the board exam. Students who attend medical schools
where a relatively large proportion of ﬁrst-year students are undecided or prefer a high-income
specialty receive relatively high board scores.
In column two of Table III we report coeﬃcient estimates from a speciﬁcation that includes
school ﬁxed eﬀects.9 Although the coeﬃcients on student characteristics do not change, the
coeﬃcients on the ability and specialty peer eﬀect variables become much smaller and all are
insigniﬁcant. Students who attend schools that have smart students perform relatively well
on the board exam. This improvement appears to be caused by either characteristics of the
school, such as the curriculum and the faculty, or the unobserved ability of the student, not the
abilities of a student’s peer group. The peer eﬀect coeﬃcients are now identiﬁed by changes
within a school over time in the average MCAT score and specialty preferences of ﬁrst-year
students.
The coeﬃcient estimates on the school indicator variables have a range of 21 points from
the school with the smallest to the largest incremental eﬀect on a student’s board score. This
21 point range is about 1.2 standard deviations of the board score among the entire sample.
9The school indicator variables are jointly signiﬁcant. The log likelihood of the model is reported in Table
V.
15These coeﬃcients measure the incremental eﬀect of a school on a student’s accumulation of
human capital and the eﬀect of the unobserved ability that is common among the students
but uncorrelated with observed ability.
The insigniﬁcance of the peer eﬀect coeﬃcients in the latter speciﬁcation may occur because
we mistakenly deﬁned a peer group as a student’s entire medical school cohort rather than the
students within a person’s class who are of the same race or sex. It is also possible that certain
types of students beneﬁt more from working with high ability students than others. We test
these hypotheses in Table IV. The ﬁrst column repeats the ability peer eﬀect estimates from
the base speciﬁcation (Table III). As shown in the last three rows of the table, the deﬁnition
of a peer group, with and without school ﬁxed eﬀects, has little impact on the coeﬃcients on
a student’s own ability.
In the second set of estimates, the school-wide peer eﬀect is interacted with the black
indicator variable to see if blacks receive larger spillovers from their peers. The coeﬃcients
are large and negative for both the verbal and biology peer eﬀect. However, none of the black
interactions are statistically signiﬁcant regardless of whether or not we control for school ﬁxed
eﬀects. Apparently there is not enough variation in MCAT scores in this version of the peer
group variable to precisely estimate the peer eﬀect. In all other speciﬁcations there is suﬃcient
variation to precisely estimate the peer eﬀect.
In the third speciﬁcation of Table IV, we deﬁne the peer group for non-black students to be
the entire medical school class, as before. For black students, we deﬁne a second peer group
that only includes the other black students in the class. This second peer eﬀect, which is
interacted with the black indicator variable, allows the abilities of black students in a cohort
to aﬀect the performance of other black students. The coeﬃcients on the interactions are
very small, both with and without school ﬁxed eﬀects. Unlike the previous set of estimates,
here the standard errors are quite small. Once again, when school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are
included, none of the peer eﬀect coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
Although none of the alternative peer group deﬁnitions yield signiﬁcant peer eﬀects for
blacks, this is not the case for women. In the fourth set of estimates, we interact the female
indicator variable with the school-wide peer eﬀect variables. The coeﬃcients on the biological
science and physical science peer eﬀects are small and insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the
verbal peer eﬀect interacted with the female indicator is positive and signiﬁcant when school
ﬁxed eﬀects are included. However, the school-wide verbal peer eﬀect is negative and larger
than the female interaction. According to these results, men actually perform worse when
16their cohort has strong verbal skills and women are unaﬀected. This seems implausible, which
suggests that the entire class may not be the correct peer group.
The ﬁnal set of estimates uses same-sex peer groups within a medical school class. That
is, males are assumed to be aﬀected only by other males, and females only by other females.
We also allow the eﬀect of a peer group to vary by gender. The coeﬃcient on the interaction
of the female indicator with the verbal reasoning peer eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant when
we control for school ﬁxed eﬀects, while the coeﬃcient for males is small and insigniﬁcant.
The biology and physical science peer eﬀects are both insigniﬁcant. It is interesting that peer
eﬀects appear to operate through the verbal score because the contribution of a student’s own
verbal reasoning MCAT score on his board score is substantially smaller than the contribution
of his biological science and physical science MCAT scores. In fact, the verbal peer eﬀect for a
female student is similar in magnitude to the eﬀect of her own verbal score. The verbal score
may capture how well individuals communicate which, based upon the results from Table IV,
may be more important for women than for men.10
We have also estimated models allowing the impact of peer groups to vary according to the
initial ability of a student (e.g., MCAT score at the bottom quartile, the middle two quartiles,
and the top quartile). If the mean ability of a peer group has the same impact on all members
of the group, then reassigning high ability students to a diﬀerent school will not aﬀect total
achievement. For peer eﬀects not to be a zero sum game, some constituents must beneﬁt
more from a peer group than others. In the debate on tracking by ability in public schools,
for example, some people argue that low ability students receive greater beneﬁts from high
ability students than do other high ability students. Using a variety of speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd
no evidence that peer groups exert a diﬀerential eﬀect by ability.11
5.2 Specialty Choice Estimates
We report estimated coeﬃcients from the specialty choice portion of the model in Table V.
The dependent variable takes on a value of one if a student prefers a high-income specialty in
his fourth year of medical school and a zero otherwise. The speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column
does not include school ﬁxed eﬀects while the speciﬁcation in the second column does.
10This speciﬁcation also has the highest log likelihood, as reported in Table VI.
11In fact, when there were diﬀerential eﬀects, it was the high-ability individuals who received the greatest
beneﬁts from their peers. The mean biology MCAT score for a medical school class had a greater (and positive)
eﬀect on the board scores of students in the highest ability quartile than students in the bottom two quartiles.
Although this result was often statistically signiﬁcant, the performance diﬀerential was small. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
17The coeﬃcient on a student’s board score is positive as expected. Students who receive
relatively high board scores are attracted to high-income specialties, even after conditioning
on a student’s ﬁrst-year specialty preference. The estimated correlation between the error
in the the board score equation and the error in the specialty choice equation is 0.11 and is
signiﬁcant (reported at the bottom of Table VI), which conﬁrms that the board score is, to
some extent, endogenous.
The coeﬃcient on the female indicator is large and negative; women are more likely than
men to switch into low-income specialties during medical school. In both speciﬁcations, the
coeﬃcients on a student’s specialty preferences in the ﬁrst year of school are positive and very
large. Although a majority of students switch specialties during medical school, preferences
are clearly correlated across time. The coeﬃcient on the proportion of a student’s peers who
prefer a high-income specialty in the ﬁrst year of medical school (the specialty preference peer
eﬀect) is positive and signiﬁcant in the model without school ﬁxed eﬀects.
In column two we report the coeﬃcient estimates when school ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
The 123 school indicator variables, whose coeﬃcients are not reported in Table V, are jointly
signiﬁcant. The only coeﬃcient that changes substantially when school ﬁxed eﬀects are in-
cluded is the specialty preference peer eﬀect variable, which is now identiﬁed by variations
within a school over time in the proportion of ﬁrst-year students who prefer high-income spe-
cialties. The magnitude of the high-income peer eﬀect falls substantially and is no longer
statistically or economically signiﬁcant. Although a student’s ultimate specialty choice is in-
ﬂuenced by the school they attend, the transmission mechanism does not appear to be the
specialty preferences of a student’s classmates, as was also the case with the board score
analysis.
Corresponding to the board score results in Table IV, we report results with diﬀerent
peer group deﬁnitions and where the magnitude of the peer eﬀect is allowed to vary by race
and gender. This extended analysis is reported in Table VI. The peer groups are deﬁned in
the same manner as in Table IV. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table VI represents the baseline
case (with and without school ﬁxed eﬀects). In the second speciﬁcation we interact the black
indicator variable with the school-wide specialty preference peer eﬀect. The third speciﬁcation
adds a second peer group variable that measures the proportion of blacks in a medical school
class who preferred a high-income specialty in their ﬁrst year of school. This race-speciﬁc
peer eﬀect variable is interacted with the black indicator variable. The fourth speciﬁcation
includes an interaction of the school-wide peer eﬀect with the female indicator variable. The
18ﬁfth speciﬁcation deﬁnes peer groups by gender and interacts the female-speciﬁc peer eﬀect
with the female indicator variable.
Without school ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the black indicator
and the overall peer eﬀect (in the third column of Table VI) has a similar magnitude as the
coeﬃcient on the overall peer eﬀect variable. The coeﬃcient on the black interaction term
remains the same when school ﬁxed eﬀects are added, while the magnitude of the overall
peer eﬀect coeﬃcient does decrease substantially (column 4 of Table VI). However, as in the
board score regression, none of the interacted peer eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant. All
the coeﬃcients on the black peer group variables in the third speciﬁcation are small and
insigniﬁcant.
In contrast to the board score analysis, where women had positive and signiﬁcant ability
peer group eﬀects when peer groups were deﬁned more narrowly, the specialty peer eﬀects for
women in Table VI are statistically insigniﬁcant and economically unimportant. This holds
both for the case when female is interacted with the overall peer eﬀect and also when peer
groups are deﬁned by gender.
Peers may inﬂuence each other at medical school in ways that we can not measure with our
data. For example, we do not actually observe students at the study group level. However,
we do observe many of the same characteristics that a medical school observes when mak-
ing admission decisions. Unlike undergraduate education, where students can be randomly
assigned across housing units (see Sacerdote 2001), medical schools can aﬀect peer groups
only through the admission of a medical school class. Medical schools cannot decide who the
medical students can or cannot study with. Hence, we believe that our peer group measures
are the most relevant ones for this study.
6 Conclusion
If peer groups inﬂuence students’ specialty choices, medical schools may be able to encourage
more students to enter primary care specialties by altering the characteristics of their matric-
ulating classes. We use the universe of medical students who graduated from U.S. medical
school schools between 1996 and 1998 to examine whether the abilities and preferences of a
student’s peer group aﬀects his achievement in medical school and his choice of specialty. We
take advantage of this rich data set to examine whether peer eﬀects are stronger when the
peer group is deﬁned by gender and race within a particular medical school class, and whether
the eﬀect of a peer group is diﬀerent across diﬀerent types of people.
19We ﬁnd that the ability of a person’s peer group does aﬀect his board score when we do not
control for the endogeneity of peer groups. When school ﬁxed eﬀects are included to control
for the endogeneity of peer groups, however, the ability peer eﬀects disappear in almost all
speciﬁcations. We ﬁnd no evidence that low-ability students receive a greater beneﬁt from
the presence of high-ability peers than do high ability students. The one positive peer eﬀect
that we ﬁnd is for female students, who appear to beneﬁt from attending medical schools that
have other female students with relatively high scores on the verbal reasoning section of the
MCAT exam.
In the models with school ﬁxed eﬀects, the peer eﬀects are identiﬁed by variation in the
average ability of students within schools over time. We provide evidence that our method
yields an upper bound on the peer eﬀect. In years where schools have relatively high ap-
plicant to entrant ratios, schools matriculate students with relatively high observed abilities.
Furthermore, in years when public medical schools have a relatively large number of in-state
entrants, observed ability is relatively low. This evidence suggests that cohorts with high
observed ability also have high unobserved ability.
We also ﬁnd positive peer eﬀects with specialty preferences when we assume the char-
acteristics of a student’s classmates are exogenous. Attending a medical school with other
students who plan on choosing a high-income specialty appears to increase a person’s board
score and the probability they will choose a high-income specialty at the conclusion of med-
ical school. We ﬁnd no evidence that specialty preference peer eﬀects are stronger when the
peer group is deﬁned by race or gender rather than the entire medical school class, or that
specialty preference peer eﬀects have a stronger impact on blacks or women. As before, when
we include school-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the endogeneity of a peer group, the spe-
cialty preference peer eﬀects become statistically and economically insigniﬁcant. Although a
student’s board score and ultimate specialty choice are inﬂuenced by the school they attend,
the transmission mechanism does not appear to be the abilities and specialty preferences of
the student’s classmates.
References
[1] Association of American Medical Colleges Medical School Admission Requirements,
United States and Canada vols. 44-46.
[2] Arcidiacono, Peter. “Compensating Diﬀerentials in College and in the Workplace,
Learning, and the Choice of College Major” Mimeo, 2001.
20[3] Bhushan, Vikas, Edward Chu, and Jeﬀrey Hansen. First Aid for the Boards: A
Student-to-Student Guide to the USMLE Step I. Norwalk, CT: Appleton & Lange, 1993.
[4] Brock, William and Steven Durlauf. “Interactions-Based Models.” Forthcoming in
J. Heckman and E. Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics vol. 5, 1999.
[5] Caucutt, Elizabeth. “Peer Group Eﬀects in Applied General Equilibrium.” Economic
Theory, forthcoming, 2000.
[6] Coleman, James S., E.Q. Campbell, et al. Equality of Educational Opportunity.
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Oﬃce, 1966.
[7] Crane, Joseph T. and Carl M. Ferraro. “Selection Criteria for Emergency Medicine
Residency Applicants.” Academic Emergency Medicine 2000, 7(1) p.p. 54-60.
[8] Dale, Stacy Berg and Alan B. Krueger. “Estimating the Payoﬀ to Attending a
More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables.”
NBER Working Paper #7322, August, 1999.
[9] Ding, Weili, and Stephen F. Lehrer. “Do Peers Aﬀect Student Achievement in
China’s Secondary Schools?” Mimeo, 2001.
[10] Epple, Dennis, and Richard Romano. “Competition Between Private and Public
Schools, Vouchers, and Peer Group Eﬀects.” American Economic Review 1998, 88 p.p.
33-62.
[11] Evans, William, Wallace Oates, and Robert Schwab. “Measuring Peer Group
Eﬀects: A Study of Teenage Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 1996, 100 p.p.
966-991.
[12] Gaviria, Alejandro, and Steve Raphael, “School- Based Peer Eﬀects and Juvenile
Behavior.” Review of Economics and Statistics 2001, 83(2) p.p. 257-268.
[13] Glaeser, Edward, Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman. “Crime and Social
Interactions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996, p.p. 507-548.
[14] Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, Jacob M. Markman, and Steven G. Rivkin.
“Do Peers Aﬀect Student Achievement?” Mimeo, Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1999.
[15] Hoxby, Caroline. “Peer Eﬀects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race
Variation.” NBER Working Paper #7867, August, 2000.
21[16] Manski, Charles F. “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 2000, 14(3) p.p. 115-136.
[17] Manski, Charles. “Identiﬁcation of Endogenous Social Eﬀects: The Reﬂection Prob-
lem.” Review of Economic Studies 1993, 60 p.p. 531-542.
[18] Neal, Derek. “The Eﬀects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational Achieve-
ment.” Journal of Labor Economics 1997, 15(1) pp. 98-123.
[19] Nechyba, Thomas J. “Mobility, Targeting, and Private-School Vouchers.” American
Economic Review 2000, 90 p.p. 130-146.
[20] Nicholson, Sean. “Physician Specialty Choice Under Uncertainty.” Journal of Labor
Economics, 2001, forthcoming.
[21] Physician Payment Review Commission. Annual Report to Congress. Washington,
D.C., 1995.
[22] Roth, Alvin. “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents:
a Case Study in Game Theory.” Journal of Political Economy 1984, 92(6) p.p. 991-1016.
[23] Sacerdote, Bruce. “Peer Eﬀects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth
Roommates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001, 116 p.p. 681-704.
[24] Sloan, Frank A. “Lifetime earnings and Physicians’ Choice of Specialty.” Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 1970, p.p. 47-56.
22Table I
Coefficient Estimates: Determinants of Receiving an Orthopedic Surgery Residency Position
         Coefficient       Standard Error
Step 1 board score  0.0225* 0.0026
Female -0.196 0.141
Black -0.154 0.176
Graduated in 1997  0.0945 0.116




Note: sample includes students who state a preference for orthopedic surgery in their fourth year
of school.  Dependent variable is 1 if they were actually in an orthopedic surgery residency
position the year after graduating from medical school, and 0 otherwise.
*significantly different from zero at the five percent level
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Probability of Entering Orthopedic Surgery For a White, Male Student Graduating in
1996
Board score among fourth-
year students who prefer
orthopedic surgery
5
th percentile (187) 0.695
Median (220) 0.894
95
th percentile (243)  0.962Table II
Sample means (n = 31,698)





   - 1996 0.279 0.449
   - 1997 0.360 0.480
   - 1998 0.361 0.480
MCAT score
   - biological sciences 9.54 1.76
   - physical sciences 9.34 1.98
   - verbal reasoning 9.41 1.76
Step 1 NBME board score 210.8 18.0
Ability peer effects:
   - biological sciences 9.52 0.763
   - physical sciences 9.32 0.880
   - verbal reasoning 9.38 0.673
Specialty preference peer effects
 - proportion of first-year  0.327 0.0749
   classmates who choose a
   high-paying specialty
 - proportion of first-year  0.246 0.0646
   classmates who are
   undecidedTable III: Determinants of a Student’s Board Store
Dependent variable is Step 1 board score (n = 31,698)
(standard errors in parenthesis)
Coefficient Estimates Coefficient Estimates
Without School Effects With School Effects
Student’s MCAT verbal reasoning 0.933* 0.903*
(0.0558) (0.055)
Student’s MCAT biological sciences 3.20* 3.18*
(0.0647) (0.0638)
Student’s MCAT physical sciences 1.85* 1.84*
(0.0594) (0.0588)
Student preferred high-income   0.680* 0.640*
   specialty in first year (0.196) (0.193)
Student was undecided in first year 0.696* 0.648*
(0.213) (0.210)
Peer Effects:
School avg verbal reasoning MCAT 1.35* -1.12
(0.239) (0.613)
School avg biological sciences MCAT 0.104 0.378
(0.471) (0.730)
School avg physical sciences MCAT -0.165 0.350
(0.411) (0.729)
Proportion of first-year classmates who 5.13* 1.07
   preferred high-income specialty (1.29) (2.43)
Proportion of first-year classmates who 7.78* 2.91
  were undecided (1.42) (2.26)
Graduated in 1997 1.08* 1.12*
(0.218) (0.240)




Note: model also includes indicator variables for females and blacks.
*significantly different from zero at the five percent levelTable IV:  Determinants of Step 1 Board Score Under Alternative Definitions of a Student's Peer Group (n=31,698)
Peer Group: Peer Group: Race-specific peer Peer Group: Peer Group:
All Students All Students effect for blacks All Students Same Gender
Overall Peer Effect
   - MCAT verbal  1.35 -1.12 1.34 -1.06 1.35 -1.09 0.975 -1.53 1.35 -0.272
(0.239) (0.613) (0.244) (0.617) (0.239) (0.613) (0.315) (0.646) (0.297) (0.474)
   - MCAT biological sci 0.104 0.378 0.211 0.496 0.1383 -0.387 0.104 0.285 0.474 0.468
  (0.471) (0.730) (0.482) (0.737) (0.472) (0.730) (0.611) (0.824) (0.522) (0.625)
   - MCAT physical sci -0.165 0.350 -0.187 0.282 -0.150 0.373 -0.117 0.485 -0.566 0.095
(0.411) (0.729) (0.420) (0.735) (0.412) (0.730) (0.535) (0.803) (0.457) (0.574)
Black interactions 
   - MCAT verbal  -1.23 -0.357 -0.513 -0.158
(1.29) (1.29) (0.504) (0.500)
   - MCAT biological sci -2.33 -2.32 -0.501 -0.300
  (2.17) (2.15) (0.617) (0.611)
   - MCAT physical sci 1.31 .986 -0.195 0.417
(1.92) (1.91) (0.614) (0.609)
Female interactions
   - MCAT verbal 0.814 0.918 0.202 1.23
(0.469) (0.464) (0.424) (0.438)
   - MCAT biological sci -0.014 0.213 -0.082 0.252
  (0.934) (0.924) (0.723) (0.766)
   - MCAT physical sci -0.092 -0.332 0.199 -0.588
(0.820) (0.811) (0.634) (0.673)
Student’s score
   - MCAT verbal 0.933 0.903 0.936 0.908 0.938 0.908 0.931 0.902 0.930 0.903
(0.0558) (0.0551) (0.0558) (0.0550) (0.0558) (0.0551) (0.0558) (0.0551) (0.0557) (0.0551)
   - MCAT biological sci 3.20 3.18 3.20 3.19 3.21 3.19 3.20 3.18 3.20 3.18
  (0.0647) (0.0638) (0.0647) (0.0638) (0.0647) (0.0638) (0.0647) (0.0638) (0.0646) (0.0638)
   - MCAT physical sci 1.85 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85
(0.0594) (0.0588) (0.0590) (0.0588) (0.0594) (0.0588) (0.0594) (0.0588) (0.0594) (0.0587)
School fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: model also includes female and black indicator variables, student's initial preferred specialty, specialty peer effects, and year indicators
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 95% levelTable V: Determinants of Specialty Choice
Utility Function Parameter Estimates for Choosing a High-Income Specialty (n = 31,698)
Dependent variable = 1 if chose high-income specialty in fourth year
(standard errors in parentheses)
Without School Effects With School Effects
Board Score  0.00350*  0.00349*
(0.00085)  (0.00104)
Student chose high-income  1.53*  0.924*
   in 1
st year  (0.0292) (0.0177)
Student undecided in first year 0.626* 0.372*
(0.0322)  (0.0194)
Peer effects:
Proportion of first-year classmates 0.933* -0.0336
   preferring high-income specialty (0.188) (0.221)
Proportion of first-year classmates 0.167 -0.0748





Graduated in 1997 0.0650* 0.0173
(0.0324) (0.0211)
Graduated in 1998 0.132* 0.0393
(0.0345) (0.0249)
Constant - 2.86* -2.43*
(0.294) (0.413)
Log likelihood -149135 -148428
*significantly different from zero at the five percent levelTable VI:  Determinants of Specialty Choice in Fourth Year of Medical School (n=31,698)
Peer Group: Peer Group: Race-specific peer Peer Group: Peer Group:
All Students All Students effect for blacks All Students Same Gender
Overall Peer Effect
% of first year students  0.560  -0.034  0.531  -0.065  0.555  -0.039  0.564  -0.044  0.423  0.044
choosing high-income (0.113) (0.221) (0.115) (0.223) (0.113) (0.221) (0.145) (0.239) (0.118) (0.154)
% of first year students 0.102 -0.075 0.083 -0.101 0.106 -0.072 0.127 -0.063 0.204 -0.083
undecided (0.125) (0.207) (0.128) (0.209) (0.125) (0.207) (0.161) (0.230) (0.148) (0.186)
Black interactions
% of first year students 0.573 0.525 0.110 0.065
choosing high-income (0.483) (0.491) (0.171) (0.173)
% of first year students 0.418 0.441 -0.079 -0.097
undecided (0.558) (0.565) (0.208) (0.211)
Female interactions
% of first year students -0.010 0.023 0.071 0.115
choosing high-income (0.211) (0.212) (0.183) (0.194)
% of first year students -0.062 -0.281 -0.338 -0.057
undecided (0.244) (0.246) (0.206) (0.220)
Board Score 0.0035 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 0.0035 0.0036 0.0035
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Rho 0.111 0.114 0.112 0.115 0.112 0.115 0.110 0.113 0.110 0.113
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
School fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log likelihood -149315 -148428 -149126 -148422 -149219 -148424 -149131 -148422 -149133 -148420
Note: regressions also include female and black indicator variables, student's initial preferred specialty, and year indicators
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 95% level